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Abstract: 
This article seeks to examine the fundamental juridical nature, classification and 
enforcement of choice of law agreements in international commercial contracts. At the 
outset, it will be observed that the predominance of jurisdictional disputes in international 
civil and commercial litigation has displaced choice of law issues to the periphery. The 
inherent dialectic between the substantive law paradigm and the internationalist paradigm 
of party autonomy will be harnessed to provide us with the necessary analytical framework 
to examine the various conceptions of such agreements and aid us in determining the most 
appropriate classification of a choice of law agreement. A more integrated and sophisticated 
understanding of the emerging transnationalist paradigm of party autonomy will guide us 
towards a conception of choice of law agreements as contracts, albeit contracts that do not 
give rise to promises inter partes. This coherent understanding of both the law of contract 
and choice of law has significant ramifications for the enforcement of choice of law 
agreements. 
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This article examines the fundamental juridical nature, classification and enforcement of 
choice of law agreements in international commercial contracts. At the outset, it will be 
observed that the predominance of jurisdictional disputes in international civil and 
commercial litigation has displaced choice of law issues to the periphery. The inherent 
dialectic between the substantive law paradigm and the internationalist paradigm of party 
autonomy will be harnessed to provide us with the necessary analytical framework to 
examine the various conceptions of such agreements and aid us in determining the most 
appropriate classification of a choice of law agreement. In binary terms, we are offered a 
choice between choice of law agreements as mere “factual” agreements on the one hand or 
as promises on the other. However, a more integrated and sophisticated understanding of 
the emerging transnationalist paradigm of party autonomy will guide us towards a 
conception of choice of law agreements as contracts, albeit contracts that do not give rise to 
promises inter partes. This coherent understanding of both the law of contract and choice of 
law has significant ramifications for the enforcement of choice of law agreements. It will be 
argued that the agreement of the parties on choice of law will be successful in contracting 
out of the default choice of law norms of the forum and selecting the applicable law but 
cannot be enforced by an action for “breach” of contract. 
The article will commence by assessing the relative significance of choice of law issues as 
compared to jurisdictional matters in private international law. This will be followed by an 
examination of the fundamental juridical nature and classification of choice of law 
agreements, which is the central concern of this article. Our understanding of the nature of 
choice of law agreements will then have important implications for the enforcement such 
agreements.                
 
The Primacy of Jurisdictional Disputes in Private International Law1 
Before examining the fundamental juridical nature, classification and enforcement of choice 
of law agreements, it is useful to digress and assess the broader question of the proper role 
and scope of choice of law considerations in international civil and commercial litigation 
before the English courts.2 In recent times, it has become apparent in the leading global 
                                                          
1 AS Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2003) 14-19, 23-48; R 
Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2015) 9-12; A Briggs, 
Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) Preface, vii; RH Graveson, 
Comparative Conflict of Laws (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1977) 8; A Fiorini, “The Codification of Private 
International Law in Europe - Could the Community Learn from the Experience of Mixed Jurisdictions” (2008) 
23 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 89, 100. 
2 See MP Fons, “Commercial Choice of Law in Context: Looking Beyond Rome” (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 
241. 




centres of transnational litigation that the outcome of a case depends much more on 
jurisdictional concerns than choice of law.       
The significance and frequency of jurisdictional disputes is witnessed by the fact that in the 
English courts there are far more reported cases on international jurisdiction and procedure 
than on choice of law.3 These jurisdictional disputes are very rarely pursued until trial and 
are more in the nature of interim border skirmishes between the litigating parties to 
establish superiority.4 This “litigation about where to litigate”5 often witnesses a relatively 
disadvantaged party capitulating and seeking to settle or compromise. However, there may 
be instances where a coordinated attempt at multistate litigation becomes necessary as in 
international fraud litigation where the widespread nature of the fraud and its perpetrators, 
and the dissipation of its monetary proceeds leave no other option.6 Therefore, 
jurisdictional disputes in the English courts may settle before the trial stage where the 
application of choice of law rules and foreign law become most relevant.7  
However, from the perspective of transaction planning and litigation strategy, choice of law 
considerations cannot be ignored as they may determine where a party may sue if the 
choice of law rules of that forum give a wide effect to the choice of law agreement in the 
absence of any countervailing factors such as overriding mandatory rules and the public 
policy of the forum. On the other hand, a party seeking to avoid the choice of law 
agreement may seek a forum which limits the autonomy of the parties as to choice of law, 
restricts the scope of the applicable law or contains an anomalous public policy provision, 
which overrides the applicable law. The applicable law may in some cases determine the 
outcome of a dispute and thus influence the choice of forum. The applicable law is a factor 
to consider in determining the natural forum for the purposes of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.8 An English choice of law agreement also provides a jurisdictional gateway for 
service out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the English court.9 
                                                          
3 TC Hartley, International Commercial Litigation (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2015) 6. 
4 C McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 36-40. 
5 Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 153, [2008] Bus LR D141, [3] (in the context of the 
Brussels I Regulation): “Too often one finds parties litigating as much about where and when disputes should 
be heard and decided as about the real underlying dispute”; See TM Yeo, “The Future of Private International 
Law in Singapore” Seventh Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture, Singapore Management University 
(22 May 2014), 17. 
6 McLachlan (supra n 4). 
7 Cf Article 25(1) of Brussels Ia and Article 5(1) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention provide that the 
substantive validity of a choice of court agreement will be determined by the law of the chosen forum 
including its private international law rules. Therefore, a choice of law provision may be applied at the 
jurisdictional stage to determine whether the choice of court agreement is valid. However, it is likely that the 
new choice of law rule will be narrowly construed by the CJEU, see Case C-222/15 Hoszig kft v Alstom Power 
Thermal Services ECLI:EU:C:2016:224, [47], where AG Szpunar examined the scope of the lex fori prorogatum 
rule and suggested that the new formulation does not attempt to reverse the CJEU ’s jurisprudence on the 
autonomous determination of factual consent.    
8 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460, 478 (HL) (Lord Goff of Chieveley); RA Brand 
and SR Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements (Oxford University Press, 2007) 33; R Fentiman, “Foreign Law and the Forum 




The choice of a particular forum in an exclusive choice of court agreement may indicate that 
the parties intend the contract to be governed by the law of the chosen forum.10 At 
common law, an exclusive choice of court clause is considered to be “a weighty indication”11 
of the parties’ common intention, albeit “one which may yield to others”.12 On the other 
hand, Recital 12 of the Rome I Regulation is more restrictive and provides that an exclusive 
choice of court agreement should be one of the factors to be taken into account in 
determining whether a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated.13 Unlike the Rome I 
Regulation which refers to the effect of a forum clause in a recital, Article 4 of the Hague 
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts contains a direct 
reference as to the effect of a forum clause on tacit choice of law: “An agreement between 
the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court or an arbitral tribunal to determine disputes 
under the contract is not in itself equivalent to a choice of law.”14 
There are various reasons why choice of law has such a limited influence on the outcome of 
international civil and commercial litigation. Significantly, the procedural law of the forum is 
immune from the effects of choice of law.15 Moreover, the English common law’s right-
remedy approach to the substance-procedure distinction adopts a wide view of the proper 
and legitimate scope of the law of procedure.16 However, the EU instruments on choice of 
law in contractual and non-contractual matters have reduced the scope of the law of the 
forum, as compared to English common law private international law.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Conveniens” in JAR Nafziger and S Symeonides (eds), Law and Justice in a Multistate World: Essays in Honor of 
Arthur T. von Mehren (Transnational Publishers, 2002) 275; M Hook, “The Choice of Law Agreement as a 
Reason for Exercising Jurisdiction” (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 963, 965. 
9 CPR PD 6B para 3.1(6)(c). 
10 For a discussion of the English common law presumption Qui elegit judicem elegit jus see, BA Marshall, 
“Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract” (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 15-17. 
11 Compagnie d’Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572, 587–91, 593, 
596–600, 604–7 (HL); John Kaldor Fabricmaker Pty Ltd v Mitchell-Cotts Freight (Australia) Pty Ltd (1989) 18 
NSWLR 172, 187. 
12 Compagnie d’Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572, 596 (Lord 
Wilberforce). 
13 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations OJ L/2008/177/6. (“Rome I Regulation”) 
14 Article 4 of the Hague Choice of Law Principles and Commentary in Permanent Bureau of the Conference, 
The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (Approved on 19 March 2015), 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt40en.pdf accessed 24 November 2017. 
15 Lex fori regit processum: “the law of the forum governs procedure”: See infra n 124. 
16 R Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 7-10; 
Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2007] 2 AC 1; See M Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of 
the Law of the Forum (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) Chapter VIII, 193. 
17 The Rome I and II Regulations adopt a direct approach, whereby certain issues are subjected to the 
applicable law of the obligation [for example the existence, nature and assessment of damage, (Article 15(c) 
Rome II; Article 12(1)(c) Rome I) and limitation of actions (Article 15(h) Rome II; Article 12(1)(d) Rome I] and 
others, for example formal validity, to the law of the obligation or the law of the country of performance of the 
act (lex loci actus).(Article 21 Rome II; Article 11(1) Rome I) See Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private 
International Law (supra n 16) 37-39. 




The English common law’s treatment of foreign law may be pragmatic and cost efficient but 
it lacks a conception of foreign law that is principled, multilateral and does not discriminate 
on the basis of the origin of the law.18 Foreign law is a question of fact for the English 
courts.19 As a consequence, the foreign law has to be pleaded by the party seeking to rely 
on the law. Furthermore, the content of the foreign law has to be proved to the satisfaction 
of the court. If neither party pleads the applicability of foreign law, the court will apply 
English domestic law to the issues in dispute. The English court has neither power nor duty 
to apply foreign law ex officio. It may be observed that, contract and tort cases litigated in 
the English courts will frequently be decided by application of English domestic law, even 
though choice of law rules might have indicated that a foreign law should be applied.20 The 
difficulties in determining, understanding and correctly applying foreign law cannot be 
understated.21  
The centrality of the procedural law of the forum in jurisdictional disputes and the wider 
conception of procedure in the English common law has effectively displaced choice of law 
concerns from the centre stage of private international law. Moreover, the English common 
law’s pragmatic approach to proof of foreign law offers the litigants a flexible device to 
evade the choice of law issue altogether and instead rely on domestic English private law. As 
a result, these forum centric features of English private international law relegate choice of 
law considerations to a secondary position.    
 
The Emerging Transnationalist Paradigm of Party Autonomy and the Nature of Choice of 
Law Agreements 
The principle of party autonomy presents itself as a “theoretically unresolved”22 “Gordian 
knot”23 of the conflict of laws at the crux of the procedure/substance, public law/private law 
                                                          
18 In civil law legal systems foreign law is a question of law and the judge is under a duty to establish the 
foreign law; accordingly, it is not permissible to simply apply the local law (or presume that it is the same). The 
civil law judge is presumed to know the law, which is well expressed by the Latin adage jura novit curia (the 
judge knows the law). Moreover, he has the duty to apply the law on the facts, which is expressed by the other 
famous Latin adage da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus (give me the facts, I will give you the law): S Geeroms, Foreign 
Law in Civil Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2004) 30-34; See “Foreign law” in Jowitt’s Dictionary of English 
Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th edn, 2015). 
19 See generally, R Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press, 1998); For a discussion on 
the sua sponte application of choice of law rules and foreign law: Bogdan (supra n 16) Chapter VI, “Should 
Conflict Rules and Foreign Law Be Applied Ex Officio?”. 
20 A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 2013) 9. 
21 Lord Mance, “The Future of Private International Law” (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 185, 
191. 
22 J Basedow, The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation in the Conflict of Laws (Brill 
Nijhoff, 2015) 115. 
23 SC Symeonides, “General Report” in Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: Progress or 
Regress? (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999) 1, 38– 40; M Lehmann, “Liberating the Individual from 
Battles between States: Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws” (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 381, 385. 




and international law/national law divides. A deeper and more comprehensive 
understanding of the concept will further our understanding of the nature and enforcement 
of choice of law agreements. 
It may be asked that if private international law ought to be regarded as essentially and 
primarily public, systemic and international in character, whether the concept of party 
autonomy can be satisfactorily reconciled let alone accommodated within this regulatory 
conception of the discipline.24 In other words, if the public rules of private international law 
are about the allocation of state power, how can individuals grant (by selecting the 
applicable law in a choice of law agreement) or take away (by ousting the forum’s default 
choice of law rules) the power that properly belongs to states?25 Apart from the 
incompatibility with the multilateral method of closest relationship in private international 
law, party autonomy also does not fit well with other traditional methods.26 This 
incompatibility may be attributed to traditional conflicts methods being built around the 
state and its relations.27 The concept cannot be justified in a statutist theory because party 
autonomy is not concerned with the law’s own intended scope of application. A theory of 
acquired or vested rights cannot accommodate party autonomy because when and whether 
rights are acquired is determined by states and not by parties. It is also incompatible with a 
focus on governmental interests because governmental interests cannot be determined by 
private parties. Therefore, party autonomy has been described as the new paradigm of 
private international law.28 
Some private international lawyers have traditionally viewed party autonomy as indicating 
that the only limits on the national regulation of private international law are those 
concerned with private justice and fairness – concerns which are met if the defendant has 
freely agreed in advance to the law, even if there are no other objective connections.29 If a 
state applies law in civil proceedings based purely on consent by the parties, this is difficult 
to reconcile with the traditional public international law requirement that the selected law 
must be justified by a substantial objective connection, typically territoriality or 
                                                          
24 A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 291 – 95. 
25 Cf “How can individuals have a say in the international distribution of legislative competencies?”: Lehmann, 
Liberating the Individual from Battles between States (supra n 23) 412. 
26 See R Michaels, “Party Autonomy in Private International Law--A New Paradigm without a Solid 
Foundation?” (126th Conference of the Private International Law Association of Japan, 2 June 2013) 2, 
www.pilaj.jp/data/2013_0602_Party_Autonomy.pdf ; R Michaels, “Party Autonomy in Private International 
Law--A New Paradigm without a Solid Foundation?” (2014) 15 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 
(forthcoming). 
27 Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles between States (supra n 23) 412. 
28 Michaels, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (supra n 26) 3. 
29 Michaels, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (supra n 26) 3, refers to the national private law 
conception of private international law as the “substantive law” paradigm. The promissory approach to choice 
of law agreements can be subsumed under the substantive law paradigm. 




nationality.30 Faced with this argument, it might seem that there are two alternatives: first, 
rejecting the idea that private international law is about the allocation of regulatory 
authority between states (denying any connection between public and private international 
law, thus rejecting the application of choice of law rules to civil disputes, leaving them 
unrestrained except under national law), or second, making unrealistic arguments against 
party autonomy based on state interests.31 
The synthesis of the clash between a substantive law paradigm of party autonomy with no 
regard for the international allocative function of private international law and an 
internationalist paradigm of party autonomy which is subordinate to state interests has 
been described as a “paradigm shift”32 leading to the emergence of a transnationalist 
paradigm of party autonomy which will replace the underlying assumptions of the existing 
paradigms with a new set of foundational principles.33 
The classification of a choice of law agreement as “factual data”34 relevant to the application 
of one of the connecting factors of the lex fori can be subsumed under the internationalist 
paradigm of party autonomy. The choice of law agreement constitutes a mere factor in the 
                                                          
30 Michaels (ibid), refers to international public law conception of private international law as the 
“internationalist” paradigm. The objective choice of law rules of the forum are representative of the 
internationalist paradigm.  
31 Under Beale’s First Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), party autonomy was rejected because individuals 
were acting as “legislators”. This was an early direct rejection of “individual sovereignty” which encouraged 
scepticism about rigid private international law rules more generally, contributing to the American “realist” 
challenge to private international law. 
32 See T Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1962); M Van Hoecke and M 
Warrington, “Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law” 
(1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, 513. For the application of the idea of “legal 
paradigms” to adjudicatory authority in private international law and how paradigms differ from “principles”, 
“concepts” and “theories”, see R Michaels, “Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction” (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1003, 1022– 27. For a more preliminary distinction between the categories of “rules”, 
“principles” and “policies”, see R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) 22– 28. 
33 Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (supra n 32) 1069; McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation 
(supra n 4) 438 – 39, suggests that the contours of a new solution to lis pendens developed as a result of 
cooperative law reform and driven by the imperatives of globalisation which synthesises the civilian and 
common law solutions is already upon us. He cites the Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring 
Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Litigation (2000), Arts 21 and 22 of the Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (30 October 1999), Art 15 of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation and judicial cooperation and communication in matters of insolvency and international child 
abduction as examples of this development; see also, RA Brand , “Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy 
in Private International Law : Regression at the European Court of Justice” in J Erauw , V Tomljenovic and P 
Volken (eds), Universalism, Tradition and the Individual , Liber Memorialis Petar Šarèiviè (Sellier European Law 
Publishers, 2006) 35, who discusses traditional concepts of state sovereignty and how those notions fail to 
account for “the new world of sovereign authority” in private international law where the allocations of 
authority in multilateral private international law rules have to integrate the expanded recognition of party 
autonomy; Cf Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles between States (supra n 23) 415, refers to the 
need for a “major paradigm shift” where party autonomy is justified by the individual at the centre of the 
conflicts problem and state relations that have so far been the focus of the classical theory are ignored. 
34 AE Anton, Private International Law: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (SULI/W Green, 1967) 189; 
AV Dicey, Conflict of Laws (Stevens, 2nd edn, 1908) 820; Cf E Rabel, The Conflict of Laws (University of Michigan 
Law School, 2nd edn, 1960) 368-369, characterised a choice of law agreement as a “true contract”. 




determination of the applicable law and has no strict legal effect.35 This extra-legal 
agreement records the mutual or common intention of the parties as to the applicable law, 
which may or may not be adhered to by the court. Therefore, the exercise of party 
autonomy under the internationalist paradigm is subordinate to state interests and the 
objective choice of law rules of the forum. 
The classification of choice of law agreements as mutual promises36 to sue in a jurisdiction 
that will apply the law selected in the clause is best represented by the substantive law 
paradigm of party autonomy. The conception of contracts as the mutual exchange of 
promises provides the necessary legal basis for a promissory approach to choice of law 
agreements.37 The domestic private law principles of the freedom and sanctity of contract 
and pacta sunt servanda also lend support to the existence of this obligation and its 
enforcement. However, the enforcement of this promise within an unrestrained substantive 
law paradigm may cause untold damage to the reputation of private international law as a 
structural coordinating framework for the allocation of regulatory authority. The private law 
enforcement of the mutual contractual obligation not to sue in a forum that will disregard 
the applicable law selected in a choice of law agreement may operate as a “unilateral 
private international law rule” with a controversial and confrontational allocative function 
of its own. It may lead to the “privatization of court access” by dubiously perpetuating and 
prioritizing the unilateral private ordering of private law over the multilateral public 
ordering of private law. Moreover, the enforcement of choice of law agreements by private 
law remedies within a multilateral system will necessarily distort the allocative or 
distributive function of private international law rules by giving precedence to the 
redistributive will of the parties premised on principles of corrective justice inter partes of 
questionable applicability. International structural order is compromised in the unilateral 
private law enforcement of choice of law agreements as such enforcement gives rise to a 
clash of sovereign legal orders and also the possibility of “regime collision” by interfering 
with the jurisdiction, judgments and choice of law apparatus of foreign courts which a 
multilateral conception of private international law is supposed to prevent in the first place. 
A more reconciled transnationalist paradigm of party autonomy will strike a balance 
between the competing demands of the internationalist and the substantive law paradigms. 
A conception of a choice of law agreement as a contract, albeit one that does not give rise 
to any promises inter partes provides an appropriate solution.38 On the one hand, the choice 
of law agreement is a bilateral legal act, or a legally binding agreement as opposed to a 
                                                          
35 Boissevain v Weil [1949] 1 KB 482, 491 (Lord Denning): “I do not believe that parties are free to stipulate by 
which law the validity of their contract is to be determined. Their intention is only one of the factors to be 
taken into account.” 
36 Briggs, Agreements (supra n 1) 445; See also, Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
90, 100 (QB) where a choice of law agreement was described as a “bargain”; Cf Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose 
Enterprise Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [47], characterised a choice of law agreement as a “declaratory” act. 
37 See C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Harvard University Press, 1981). 
38 M Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Hart Publishing, 2016) Chapter 2, arrives at a very similar conclusion 
regarding the nature and classification of choice of law agreements as this author.   




mere “factual” agreement. On the other hand, the function of this agreement is not to 
create or modify rights and obligations: it is to opt out of the forum’s objective choice of law 
rules and to choose the applicable law. The fact that the choice of law agreement is a 
contract, which only gives rise to procedural consequences, does not mean that it is not, or 
should not be, described as a contract.39 A consent-based theory of contract thus treats as 
the core of contract a manifest intention to be legally bound.40      
 
The Promissory Classification of Choice of Law Agreements and its Discontents 
Under the proper law doctrine of the English common law, a court gives effect to an express 
choice of law, as long as it is bona fide, legal and not contrary to public policy.41 Hence, the 
entitlement of the parties to select the governing law is not absolute and there are 
limitations on it.42 The Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
replaced the English common law’s proper law doctrine on 1 April 1991.43 For contracts 
concluded after 17 December 2009,44 the Rome I Regulation applies to cases involving a 
contractual obligation in civil and commercial matters litigated before an English court and 
involving a choice between the laws of different countries.45 
Drawing an analogy with arbitration and choice of court agreements, Briggs argues that 
choice of law agreements have two functions. The first is to identify the proper law of the 
contract. The second emanates from the promissory effect of a choice of law agreement 
and is concerned with the consequences of breaching a choice of law agreement. Therefore, 
“a choice of law clause may be interpreted as telling a court what it needs to know to 
adjudicate the dispute under the contract, and as each party telling the other what promises 
are made as to the law which will be applied to the contract”.46 Ascribing the negative 
aspect of an arbitration agreement and exclusive choice of court agreement47 to choice of 
                                                          
39 For a similar argument in relation to choice of court agreements as “procedural contracts” under the 
Brussels Ia Regulation, see, M Ahmed, The Nature and Enforcement of Choice of Court Agreements: A 
Comparative Study (Hart Publishing, 2017) 76-82.  
40 R Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract” (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 269; RE Jones and G 
MacCormack, “Obligations” in E Metzger (ed), A Companion to Justinian’s Institutions (London, Duckworth, 
1998) 127, 150. 
41 Vita Food Products Ltd v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] UKPC 7, [1939] AC 277 (Lord Wright) There is no 
reported English decision in which an express choice was disapplied on the basis of the provisio. See J Hill and 
MN Shuilleabhain, Clarkson and Hill’s Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2016) 212. 
42 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [52] (Brereton J). 
43 The Rome Convention 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (OJ C 27, 26.1.1998, p 36-53) 
was enacted into law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 in the UK.  
44 Articles 28 and 29 of the Rome I Regulation.  
45 Article 1(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 
46 Briggs, Agreements (supra n 1) 436 (emphasis in original). 
47 For the negative aspect of an arbitration agreement and exclusive choice of court clause See, Ust-
Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 
WLR 1889; [2013] 1 CLC 1069, [21]-[28] (Lord Mance with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption 
and Lord Toulson agreed) . 




law agreements, Briggs suggests that a choice of law clause in favour of State X may be 
reinterpreted to connote both an agreement that, if a dispute arises, the claimant will 
contend that the parties’ relationship is governed by the law of State X; but also an 
agreement between the parties that no law other than the law of State X shall govern their 
relationship.48 
An express choice of law agreement specifies the applicable law of a contract.49 The 
substantive rights and obligations of the parties to the contract will be determined by 
reference to the applicable law.50 However, the court seised with jurisdiction may not apply 
the selected law for a number of reasons – whether because its choice of law rules directed 
the judge to apply a different law; or its own choice of law rules, while accepting the right of 
the parties to choose the applicable law, regarded the particular choice as impermissible; or 
that the court was directed by its own choice of law rules to apply mandatory domestic law 
or public policy; or that the court errs in its application of the chosen law. A controversial 
issue is whether adherence to a governing law clause may be enforced by an action for 
breach of contract.51    
In other words, the legal basis of an action for breach of a choice of law agreement hinges 
on the appropriate classification of a choice of law agreement. Is the appropriate 
classification of a choice of law agreement “promissory” or “declaratory” in nature? A 
decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court (Australia) has brought this issue to the 
fore and has tested the viability of Briggs’ ideas regarding breach of choice of law 
agreements in a practical context. Ace Insurance v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd52, is probably 
the first common law decision to consider whether proceedings in a foreign court could 
constitute breach of a choice of law agreement.53 In the words of Briggs this is “territory into 
which the English courts have not [yet] been invited to go”.54 
One of the arguments advanced by counsel for the claimant in that case was that by 
commencing Californian proceedings for the purposes of taking advantage of Californian 
law, the defendant had broken the implied promise arising from the Australian choice of law 
clause, and that an anti-suit injunction should be issued to restrain this breach. In support of 
this novel argument, the counsel for the claimant relied on the suggestions of Briggs in 
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Agreements.55 Brereton, J. observed that the submission was premised on the proposition 
that the choice of law agreement was promissory in effect and held: 
No doubt a contractual provision could be framed which unambiguously contained a 
promise to do nothing that might result in some other system of law becoming 
applicable. However, in my opinion that is not ordinarily the effect of a choice of law 
clause, which is usually declaratory of the intent of the parties, rather than 
promissory.56  
In our system of private international law, therefore, choice of law is about 
ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the legal system that is to govern their 
contract, not about covenants or promises that a particular legal system will 
apply…..It may well be that the parties could frame a provision which was 
promissory in effect, but – given the conventional function of a choice of law clause 
– it would require very clear language to make it promissory rather than 
declaratory.57  
Although Brereton, J. acknowledged the possibility of an appropriately framed choice of law 
clause using “very clear language” leading to a promissory effect, he nevertheless refused to 
give effect to the clause in the instant case by relying on the conventional declaratory 
function of such clauses.58 The path well-trodden was chosen and rightly so considering the 
dearth of judicial authority and a lack of academic consensus for the novel interpretation of 
choice of law agreements advanced by Briggs. 
The promissory effect of a choice of law agreement was also examined by the English 
Commercial Court in The Lucky Lady.59 In that case, Navig8 (a Singaporean company) sought 
permission to serve Al-Riyadh (a Jordanian company) out of the jurisdiction, on the basis 
that proceedings brought by Al-Riyadh in Jordan were contrary to a choice of English law. Al-
Riyadh claimed damages from Navig8 as the alleged carrier of damaged cargo. The bill of 
lading provided for English law. Pursuant to Jordanian choice of law rules, however, the law 
governing the dispute was Jordanian law. In the English court, Navig8 sought an anti-suit 
injunction, damages and a negative declaration that it was not a party to the contracts of 
carriage. It argued that, because English law contained certain protections that were not 
available to it under Jordanian law, the Jordanian proceedings were “designed to 
defeat….their rights under English law”.60 
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The English court rejected the applications for an anti-suit injunction and damages, on the 
basis that, by commencing the Jordanian proceedings, Al-Riyadh did not contravene “any 
(contractual or other) duty owed to Navig8”.61 The court found that in effect Navig8 was 
claiming:62 
a right, deriving apparently from the choice of English law, not to be sued in any 
jurisdiction that does not give effect to a choice of English law that is recognised by 
English private international law, at least unless the foreign jurisdiction recognises 
rights similar to those recognised by English law. 
The court held that: “There is no proper basis for so wide a proposition”.63 Nevertheless, the 
court was willing to grant permission for leave to serve out of the jurisdiction the claims for 
declaratory relief, concluding that England was the proper place for these claims because of 
the parties’ choice of English law.  
Therefore, the English High Court in The Lucky Lady was quick to reject a submission that 
the English choice of law agreement conferred a right on the applicant to be sued in a forum 
that would give effect to it.64 This ruling has confirmed the previous finding of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court in Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd that an ordinary 
choice of law agreement did not “found implied negative stipulations” as to jurisdiction.65 
Takahashi also doubts whether a choice of law agreement could entail a promissory effect.66 
He argues that in most cases, a choice of law clause does not contain an express 
undertaking not to bring an action in a court, which would deny effect to it. Therefore, it is 
even more difficult to read such an implied undertaking into a choice of law clause. He 
concludes that a contractual claim seeking damages for breach of a choice of law clause 
should not be allowed unless the agreement contains an express undertaking not to bring 
an action in a court, which would deny effect to it. It is submitted, that the conventional 
wisdom in the dicta of Brereton, J. in the Ace Insurance decision is reflected in Takahashi’s 
views. 
Basedow starts his inquiry into the binding effect of choice of law agreements by 
highlighting that “an inappropriate commingling of different types of contracts” has 
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occurred.67 He submits that a choice of law agreement is of a different nature from an 
unfulfilled contract in which there is a mutual exchange of promises as to future conduct. He 
maintains that choice of law agreements are self-fulfilling dispositional contracts.68 The 
effect of the agreement was realised at the moment it was jointly adopted by the parties. 
The contract embodies a dispositional character in that it disposes off the assignment of the 
contract to one of the several hundred legal orders found across the world. Hook classifies 
choice of law agreements as contracts for the disposition of the default choice of law 
norms.69 These positions are in contrast to the classification adopted by Briggs, which 
conceives choice of law agreements as part of a comprehensive dispute resolution 
agreement regulating the future conduct of the parties.70 It should be noted that both 
Basedow and Hook treat choice of law agreements as executed contracts whereas Briggs 
conceptualises them as executory contracts.71 
Fentiman comments on the possible promissory nature of choice of law agreements with: 
“It is unclear how it assists to view the matter in contractual terms.”72 He argues that it 
cannot be a breach to invite a court to characterise a given issue as one not falling within 
the scope of the agreed law, such as the law of the forum (lex fori). Such an allegation does 
not in any way deny that the contractual law governs matters to which it properly applies. A 
simple choice of law clause is not an agreement that the law agreed upon governs each and 
every aspect of the dispute. Moreover, if such a clause were to provide that the chosen law 
governs every aspect of a dispute it would be presumably ineffective. He concludes by 
stating that, the parties cannot by choice oust the private international law rules of the 
forum.73 
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Borrowing HLA Hart’s terminology, in the “core”74 case of exclusive choice of court 
agreements in the English common law there is an express duty to bring proceedings only in 
the contractual forum and a correlative75 right of the counterparty not to be sued in the 
non-elected forum. There is no such express duty to bring proceedings in a forum that will 
give effect to the choice of law agreement or a correlative right not to sued in a forum that 
will defeat the choice of law clause in the more doubtful “penumbra”76 case of choice of law 
agreements.77 Building on this interpretation, the breach of a choice of law agreement may 
not be enforced by either party and the choice of law agreement is simply an unequivocal 
expression of the law, which the parties intend shall govern their contractual relationship.78 
This may or may not be applied by a court faced with a dispute relating to the contract. It 
has also been argued that choice of court and choice of law agreements fundamentally 
differ from each other because if a court does not choose to apply the law specified in the 
choice of law agreement it is more difficult to conclude that either party is at fault:79 “It is in 
fact impossible to say that either contracting party breached his promise contained in the 
choice-of-law clause.” The situation with respect to choice of court agreements differs in 
that a choice of court agreement can only be breached where one party willfully institutes 
proceedings in a non-contractual forum.80 The choice of court clause can only be breached 
by the deliberate act of one party.81 
Non-exclusive choice of court agreements generally carry no promise not to sue in other 
jurisdictions.82 However, the English Court of Appeal has reminded us that it is ultimately a 
question of construction of the contract what promises the parties may have made in 
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respect of a non-exclusive choice of court agreement.83 Non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements may be the foundation for an anti-suit injunction to protect a contractual right 
if the conduct of foreign proceedings amounts to breach of an implied agreement not to 
bring such proceedings once proceedings have commenced in the non-exclusive but primary 
jurisdiction,84 or if it amounts to the breach of an implied agreement because it (being a 
foreign anti-suit injunction action) attempts to restrain the exercise of a contractual right to 
commence proceedings in the non-exclusively chosen forum at all.85 The analogy with non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements emphasises that ultimately it is a question of construction 
what promises may be inferred from the parties in the contract.86 In similar vein, it has been 
argued that whether or not a choice of law agreement is promissory in nature is, in the final 
analysis, an issue of construction.87 Brereton J also recognised that the issue is one of 
contractual construction88 and the intentions of the contracting parties are very significant 
in that regard.89 
The inherent value and necessary implications of a promissory choice of law agreement also 
need to be carefully examined. A promissory choice of law agreement comes close to being 
treated as an exclusionary jurisdiction agreement or an implied agreement to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the choice-defeating forum. It is a matter of concern that this development 
has proceeded without any consideration of the principles and rules that would usually 
govern an agreement of this kind.90 Exclusionary jurisdiction agreements that are implied 
from choice of law agreements fall short of the standard ordinarily required of choice of 
court agreements. 
It is submitted that, the “promise” in the choice of law agreement should not be enforced 
because the enforcement of an implied intention to derogate from the jurisdiction of the 
choice defeating courts is inconsistent with the principles and rules that govern 
jurisdictional party autonomy more generally. In New Hampshire Insurance Co v Strabag Bau 
AG, the Court of Appeal held that the requirements of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention 
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could only be met by a valid choice of court agreement.91 By excluding a forum, the parties 
forsake their right of access to justice in that particular forum and the parties should be 
aware of the consequences of their decision. However, it is now clear that as a matter of 
English common law conflicts principles there does not have to be an express contractual 
agreement (or indeed any formal contractual agreement) to submit but that consent can be 
express or implied.92 
An exclusionary jurisdiction agreement imputed from a choice of law agreement is neither 
express nor in most cases real. It is an implied term of the choice of law agreement that is 
based on the hypothetical or presumed intention of the parties: an agreement that the 
parties would have reasonably concluded if they had considered the matter. It is submitted 
that, parties should not be deprived of the ability to litigate in available jurisdictions on the 
basis of an imputed intention. As a matter of principle, a more stringent and objectively 
verifiable standard along the lines of the requirements for prorogation of jurisdiction should 
be a necessary pre-requisite for parties to effectively derogate from the jurisdiction of the 
available choice of law defeating courts. 
Furthermore, conceiving choice of law agreements from a purely promissory perspective 
ignores the very significant role of the law of the forum including its mandatory choice of 
law regime.93 If a choice of law agreement is accompanied by an agreement to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a given court, this presumably constitutes an agreement that the conflicts 
rules of the forum shall apply, including those giving effect to any choice of law clause. If 
such a clause is tied to a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement or contains no jurisdiction 
agreement at all, this suggests that the parties are content that the effect of the clause is 
subject to the conflicts rules of any court seised of proceedings. 
Implied choice of law under Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation is a potential source of 
difficulty for those arguing that a choice of law agreement is promissory in nature.94 Article 
3(1) provides that the choice shall be “clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case.” Where the choice of law is implied rather than express, it is 
not conceivable that there would be an implied negative stipulation not to invoke the 
jurisdiction of a court, which would apply a law other than the chosen one. It is submitted 
that, this line of reasoning supports the conclusion that where there is an express choice of 
law agreement, there is similarly no implied obligation not to invoke the jurisdiction of a 
court, which will not apply the chosen law. Therefore, the express choice of law in a choice 
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of law agreement declares the intention of the contracting parties and is not promissory. 
The provision on party autonomy in the Rome I Regulation includes both express and 
implied choice within the same rule. This further suggests that an internally consistent and 
internally coherent application of Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation requires that both 
express and implied choice of law be interpreted as specifying the applicable law and as not 
supporting the conception of choice of law agreements as promissory contracts between 
the parties to abide by the stipulated law. In the Ace Insurance decision, Brereton J used a 
similar argument to demonstrate that it cannot be a breach of contract to sue in a forum, 
which will not give effect to an “inferred” choice of law.95 The promissory nature of a choice 
of law agreement is most plausible where there is a governing law clause and less so where 
the law chosen by the parties is identified from other terms of the contract or from their 
conduct.96 Furthermore, Article 3(2) of the Rome I Regulation provides that: “The parties 
may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously 
governed it”.97 Therefore, the subsequent agreement of the parties as to choice of law will 
override the choice of law agreement and any promises that arise from it. 
In order to understand the relative autonomy of choice of law agreements and their 
functional dependence on the law of the forum it is necessary to delve deeper into the 
theoretical basis for party autonomy in choice of law. Nygh examines the source of party 
autonomy in Autonomy in International Contracts: what gives the parties permission to 
make a choice in the first place?98 First, he considers the situation where the will of the 
parties is truly autonomous and supreme.99 In this scenario, the parties may choose to have 
the contract not governed by any law at all, or by the international principles of private law 
(lex mercatoria). If they do choose a municipal system of law they cannot be bound by 
subsequent changes in the law unless they agreed to be so bound. They can also contract 
themselves out of the operation of its mandatory rules including international mandatory 
rules and the public policy of the forum. However, Nygh remarks that a “free floating” 
choice of law where the parties’ will is truly autonomous and supreme “does not as yet have 
much support”.100 On the other hand, the choice of the parties must be based on the private 
international law rules of a particular municipal legal system and the scope of that choice of 
law will be necessarily limited by the operation of the mandatory rules and public policy of 
the forum. 
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Nygh then goes on to trace the source of party autonomy in national municipal legal 
systems.101 Ehrenzweig expressed the prevailing majority view when he stated: “Party 
autonomy is, of course, not an independent source of conflicts rules, but is effective only in 
so far as it is recognised by such a rule”.102 In fact, Ehrenzweig went to the extent that he 
described this proposition as a “truism”.103 Therefore, party autonomy is only effective if it is 
inserted as a connecting factor in the relevant municipal choice of law rule. It is submitted, 
that party autonomy can only operate through the choice of law rules of a national legal 
system and that the law of the forum must provide the necessary entry point for this 
autonomy to be exercised. 
With regard to Article 3(1)104 of the Rome Convention, Nygh cites Paul Lagarde (one of the 
rapporteurs of the official accompanying report: the Giuliano-Lagarde Report) as stating 
that: “Ce choix est un choix de droit international prive”105 (“This choice is a choice of private 
international law”106). Therefore, when the parties enter into a contract in relation to the 
applicable law they are also agreeing to be bound by the mandatory private international 
law rules of the Rome Convention and its successor the Rome I Regulation that actually give 
effect to the choice of the parties and regulate or delimit the operation of the chosen law.  
Nygh explains that the concept underlying the search for an authorizing national law, 
particularly the law of the forum, is the ancient idea of the territorial sovereignty of the 
nation state and its ability to command its courts.107 On this view, any freedom that the 
parties may possess is one granted by the sovereign. This view of party autonomy as being 
predicated on the territorial sovereignty of the nation state has metamorphosed into the 
increasingly multi-dimensional and international private international law rules of the EU 
conflicts regime. 
Nygh also examines international law or custom as a source of party autonomy.108 In this 
regard, Lowenfeld has stated that “it is fair to say….that party autonomy- both for choice of 
law and for choice of forum, including an arbitral forum- is now part of an international 
customary law of dispute settlement”.109 An international basis for party autonomy is also 
supported by the Institute of International Law.110 Ralf Michaels cites this 1991 resolution of 
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the Institute of International Law as supporting the contention that party autonomy should 
be based on the notion of human rights.111 Jayme explains that the foundation of party 
autonomy lies in the principle of liberty of the individual which is a part of Human Rights, as 
proclaimed most prominently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 
1948, which applies not merely in the personal but also in the economic sphere.112 On that 
view, the freedom to choose the applicable law is not merely a connecting factor; it is the 
parties who insert their agreement in to the legal system they have freely chosen. In other 
words, the “sovereignty of the individual” is recognised in an increasingly pluralistic and 
cosmopolitan international legal order.113 In brief, “Rules of private international law strike a 
balance between facilitating internationally recognised individual autonomy and respect for 
state regulatory authority – between individual freedom and collective cultural identity.”114 
Writing at the turn of the millennium, Nygh concludes that there is still general support for 
the proposition that the law of the forum (including its choice of law rules) must provide the 
authorization for the parties to “exit” the otherwise applicable law or the jurisdiction of the 
competent court.115 However, in the context of the increasingly important and ever 
burgeoning European private international law regime, the Brussels Ia,116 Rome I and II 
Regulations provide uniform international rules for civil jurisdiction and choice of law 
matters, which form part of the law of the forum. Therefore, matters which are subject to 
and governed by the supra-national European conflicts regime may be more readily 
explained by a combination of the international justification for party autonomy and the 
justification predicated on the territorial sovereignty of the nation state. Nygh does 
recognise that the right of the parties to choose the applicable law represents a rule of 
international customary law.117    
It is the mandatory choice of law rules of the forum that characterise a given issue as 
procedural or substantive. The Rome I and II Regulations adopt a direct approach by 
subjecting particular issues to the applicable law of the contractual or non-contractual 
obligation.118 The instruments exclude matters relating to “evidence and procedure”119 from 
their scope and lack any autonomous definition for these terms. The result is that national 
law will have to be applied to determine both the meaning given to these terms and what 
law should be applied to an individual issue (assuming that the matter has not been directly 
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subjected to the applicable law by the Regulations). Considerable scope of operation is 
therefore left to national choice of law rules under the Regulations. Some commentators, in 
particular Illmer, have criticised this position, stating that the application of national law to 
matters of evidence and procedure, where the law of the cause of action falls under the 
Regulations, will lead to disharmony of court decisions and is incompatible with a European 
system of private international law.120 Illmer argues that an autonomous conception of 
“evidence and procedure” is required, based on the idea of “neutrality”,121 which means 
that a national court must apply the law of the cause of action to any issue which is 
concerned with or directed at the decision on the merits and which requires the law of the 
forum to be applied to any matter which concerns the mode or conduct of court 
proceedings. Garnett argues that whether or not an autonomous definition of procedure is 
adopted in relation to matters not considered by the Regulations, procedure should be 
based on the narrow mode and conduct of court proceedings view espoused by the 
Australian courts122 rather than the traditional right-remedy test.123 Following the lex fori 
regit processum124 rule, the law of the forum applies to matters of procedure and the 
applicable law applies to matters of substance.  
Therefore, it cannot conceivably be a breach to invite a court to characterise an issue as one 
falling within the domain of procedure and outside the proper and legitimate scope of the 
agreed applicable law. As discussed above, national courts have the responsibility of 
defining the categories of procedure and substance and allocating a particular issue to 
either category. A conventional choice of law agreement is not an agreement that the law 
agreed upon will govern each and every aspect of a dispute. Such an agreement would 
presumably be ineffective as the parties cannot by agreement oust the mandatory choice of 
law rules of the forum. 
The doctrine of renvoi may also supply courts the judicial discretion to avoid the foreign 
applicable law and apply the law of the forum instead.125 However, in the most significant 
commercial areas of private international law that dominate the discipline the use of renvoi 
                                                          
120 M Illmer, “Neutrality Matters – Some Thoughts About the Rome Regulations and the so called Dichotomy of 
Substance and Procedure in European Private International Law” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 237; 
Dickinson sees the concepts of evidence and procedure as “matters that define the scope of the Regulation” 
which must therefore be given a uniform, autonomous meaning, independent of the forum’s notions: A 
Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2008) para 14.57. 
121 Illmer, Neutrality Matters (supra n 120) 246-247. 
122 McKain v RW Miller and Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1; John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson 
(2000) 203 CLR 503. 
123 Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (supra n 16) 39; Dickinson also suggests the 
adoption of a test on similar lines: Dickinson, Rome II Regulation (supra n 120) para 14.60; Briggs and Bogdan 
too express dissatisfaction with the traditional English approach that remedies are a matter of procedure to be 
governed by the lex fori: Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (supra n 20) 193; Bogdan, Private International Law as 
Component of the Law of the Forum (supra n 16) Chapter VIII, 194. 
124 “the law of the forum governs procedure”: See Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International 
Law (supra n 16) Introduction, 1-4. 
125 Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (supra n 16) Chapter IX, 206; See 
Hill and Shuilleabhain (supra n 41) 33-42. 




is expressly outlawed. For instance, the doctrine of renvoi is excluded in the field of contract 
by the Rome I Regulation126 and in cases of non-contractual obligations by the Rome II 
Regulation.127 Therefore, the issue of the application of renvoi to the applicable law 
specified by a choice of law agreement does not arise in the first place. 
Further limitations on the content of the applicable law specified by a choice of law 
agreement take the form of overriding mandatory rules and the public policy128 (ordre 
public) of the forum.129 The contours of the public policy exception to the applicable law 
specified by a choice of law agreement can be defined, or at least described, with reference 
to the role of public policy as a basis for the non-recognition of a judgment under the 
Brussels I Regulation130 as interpreted by the CJEU:131 
In that regard, the Court explained that recourse to a public policy clause can be 
envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in 
another Contracting State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the 
legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a 
                                                          
126 Article 20 of the Rome I Regulation; See M Altenkirch, “Article 20” in F Ferrari (ed.), Rome I Regulation 
(Sellier European Law Publishers, 2015) 485-487; Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of the Law 
of the Forum (supra n 16) Chapter IX, 210; See also, Article 8 of The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts (supra n 14). 
127 Article 24 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations [2007] OJ L199/40 (“Rome II Regulation”); See M Altenkirch, “Article 
24” in P Huber (ed.), Rome II Regulation (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011) 417-419; Hill and 
Shuilleabhain (supra n 41) 34. 
128 For a discussion of a European public policy exception to the rules regarding the enforcement 
of judgments, see J Fitchen, “Chapter 13 — Article 45” in A Dickinson and E Lein (eds.), The Brussels I 
Regulation Recast (Oxford University Press, 2015) 432, 440 – 50; Mills, The Confluence (supra n 24) 194 – 98; JK 
Škerl, “European Public Policy (With an Emphasis on Exequatur Proceedings)” 
(2011) 7 Journal of Private International Law 461, 468–74; A Mills, “The Dimensions of Public Policy 
in Private International Law” (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 201, 214 . It is not for the 
CJEU to define the content of the public policy of the Contracting State but the CJEU has adopted the 
view that the limits of public policy are a question of interpretation of the Brussels Convention and 
are therefore a matter which must be determined by it: Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] 
ECR I-1935, [22]–[23]; Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973, [27]–[28]; Case C-394/07 
Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc [2009] ECR I-2563, [26]–[28]; Case C-420/07 Meletis 
Apostolides v David Charles Orams [2009] ECR I-3571, [56]–[57]; Case C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd 
v Seramico Investments Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2012:531, [49]; Case C-302/13 flyLAL-Lithunanian Airlines 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2319, [47]; Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands BV v Simiramida ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, [50]. 
129 Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (supra n 16) Chapter X, 214-257; 
SC Symeonides, “Party Autonomy in Rome I and II From a Comparative Perspective” in K Boele-Woelki, T 
Einhorn, D Girsberger and S Symeonides (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law – 
Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing, 2010) 513, 528-530; PJ Borchers, “Categorical 
Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private International Law” (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1645, 1651-1657; Cf 
HLE Verhagen, “The Tension between Party Autonomy and European Union Law: Some Observations on 
Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc” (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 135; 
See also, Article 11 of The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (supra n 
14). 
130 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L12/1. (“Brussels I Regulation”) 
131 Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc [2009] ECR I-2563 [27]; See Case C-7/98 
Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [37]; Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973 [30]. 




fundamental principle. The infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach 
of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that 
legal order (Krombach, paragraph 37).  
Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation defines overriding mandatory provisions as:132 
……..provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, 
to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation. 
Apart from the compulsory application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of 
the forum,133 effect may be given to such provisions of the law of the country where the 
obligations arising out of the contract have to be performed.134 
The mandatory rules and public policy of the forum cannot be derogated from or evaded by 
a choice of law agreement.135 Therefore, the law of the forum retains ultimate control over 
the content of the applicable law and it is not completely indifferent to the outcome of the 
dispute.136 The overriding mandatory rules of the place of performance of the contract may 
also limit the scope of the applicable law insofar as those provisions render the performance 
of the contract unlawful. 
Having considered the role of the law of the forum, it is time to examine the viability of 
remedies for breach of a choice of law agreement within the EU choice of law regime and 
beyond. Suppose that an international commercial contract is governed by an English choice 
of law agreement. If a party to the agreement sues in Italy and the Italian courts do not 
apply the English applicable law by characterizing an issue as procedural or override the 
applicable law by reference to its mandatory rules and public policy. Can the counterparty 
sue in England for breach of choice of law agreement? It is submitted, that such a cause of 
action would doubt the effectiveness of the choice of law regime of the Rome I Regulation. 
It will also indirectly imply that the party’s right to sue in the Italian courts under the 
                                                          
132 A rule with similar effect is found in Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation, although the term “overriding 
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133 Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
134 Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation; See also, Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention; See M Hellner, “Third 
Country Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Rome I Regulation: Old Wine in New Bottles?” (2009) 5 Journal of 
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Brussels Ia Regulation is undermined. Moreover, it will also mean that there is reason to 
deny effect to the resulting judgment of the Italian courts. The implications of such a cause 
of action for the principle of mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) 
militate against the possible development of this remedy in the English courts.  
To reiterate, it is perhaps misconceived to view the matter from a promissory perspective. 
The core of good sense in the conventional declaratory function of choice of law 
agreements has much to recommend it. This is due to the very prominent role of the law of 
the forum which actually authorises and recognises party autonomy as a connecting factor. 
There is, however, one situation in which it has resonance to suggest that non-compliance 
with a choice of law agreement is a breach of contract.137 Suppose that a party commences 
proceedings in breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement in a court which would not 
uphold the governing law clause as the agreed court would have done. It would presumably 
be a breach of contract to advance any argument which denies the effectiveness of the 
clause. It is submitted, that in practice a court may choose to rely on the more conventional 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement to award damages or an anti-suit injunction 
rather than grounding the action on the novel breach of a choice of law agreement. In the 
Ace Insurance decision, Brereton J after considering the issue of contravention of the 
implied negative stipulation arising from a choice of law clause, concluded by awarding an 
anti-suit injunction for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the 
Australian courts.138  
 
Enforcing the Promissory Choice of Law Agreement: Interference with the Principles of 
Mutual Trust and the Effectiveness of the EU Private International Law Regime   
Prior to considering the enforcement of a breach of a choice of law agreement, it is 
necessary to examine the particular conception of such agreements in the Rome I 
Regulation. As observed, the Brussels Ia Regulation has its own understanding of jurisdiction 
agreements and Briggs conceives that conception as enshrining a public law notion of 
jurisdiction, which does not adequately emphasise the contractual rights, encapsulated 
therein. In similar vein, the key issue is whether the European legislature conceives choice of 
law clauses in terms of dispute resolution and the conferral of private law rights by virtue of 
selection of the applicable law.139 Arguably, the Rome I Regulation is a complete code for 
determining which law or laws govern a contract. It seems unlikely that the argument that 
the choice of law clause has a separate, private law validity (irrespective of the validity 
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under the Regulation) would appeal to the CJEU.140 A subsisting, separate and promissory 
conception of such agreements would be very difficult to reconcile with a conception of 
such agreements which focusses on the application of the law of the forum and its choice of 
law rules which in turn authorise the court to apply the law selected in the choice of law 
clause, subject to the mandatory rules and public policy of the forum. Therefore, the 
promissory conception only succeeds in narrating or describing an aspect of the application 
of the choice of law rules of the forum and may not represent a universally shared 
understanding of choice of law agreements.  
The remedy sought in the Ace Insurance case was an anti-suit injunction to restrain the 
breach of contract. The cross border injunctive remedy is unavailable to the English courts in 
respect of proceedings before the courts of another Member State and within the remit of 
the Brussels Ia Regulation, as the anti-suit injunction has been deemed to undermine both 
the principle of effectiveness of the Brussels regime and the overarching mutual trust 
principle which necessarily animates the EU private international law order.141 Similar 
considerations premised on mutual trust and the principle of the effectiveness of the EU 
private international law instruments may well preclude cross border injunctive relief to 
restrain a party from commencing or continuing with proceedings in another Member State 
for the purpose of avoiding, evading or overriding the applicable law specified in a choice of 
law agreement.142 The primacy of the mutual trust principle may be gleaned from the EU 
Justice Agenda for 2020 which declares that mutual trust is the “bedrock upon which EU 
justice policy should be built”143 The controversial remedy remains available in the armoury 
of the English courts in relation to proceedings outside the European Union.144 
                                                          
140 Ibid; If an action for breach of the choice of law clause were permitted, this would also raise questions as to 
which courts should determine the meaning of a choice of law agreement; and whether only the courts first 
seised in the EU should be empowered to do so. It is submitted, that if there is no jurisdiction agreement 
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141 Case C 159/02 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101; Case C 185/07 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc [2009] 1 AC 
1138. 
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As a matter of principle, the award of damages may also be available for breach of a choice 
of law agreement in accordance with the applicable law of the contract, but this is as yet 
untested in the case law.145 A claim for damages for breach of a choice of law agreement 
constituted by actions in other Member States may, however, be precluded for being 
incompatible with the choice of law instruments.146 Moreover, the allegation that another 
Member State court refused or denied effect to the choice of law agreement also imputes 
that it was somehow wrong for the counterparty to have sued there in the first place. 
Therefore, both the right to sue in a Member State under the Brussels Ia Regulation and the 
application of forum law and choice of law rules under the Rome I Regulation are 
impeached and called into question.147 Furthermore, as the damages remedy has the effect 
of second guessing and reversing or nullifying the judgment of the courts of another 
Member State, both the Brussels Ia Regulation’s system of direct rules of jurisdiction and 
the resulting automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments are undermined. It is 
submitted that, nullifying or reversing the effect of the foreign judgment is undoubtedly 
contrary to the principle of mutual trust and the obligation not to question the jurisdiction 
of another Member State court148 and the obligation not to question a Member State 
court’s application of its own choice of law rules. The harmonised rules on jurisdiction and 
choice of law facilitate the mutual recognition of judgments within the EU and are also 
animated by the principle of mutual trust. As a general observation, the likelihood for non-
compliance with the applicable law in cases where the proceedings are commenced within 
the Brussels-Lugano regime is remote, because it is unlikely that the application of the same 
set of choice of law rules149 guided by the CJEU’s autonomous classifications will result in a 
breach of contract.150 
The argument in favour of damages for breach of a choice of law agreement must also 
overcome the problem that a foreign court’s ruling may be res judicata as to the applicable 
law. Separating the legal functions of a choice of law clause, Briggs suggests that this is not 
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incompatible with a finding by the English courts that the parties had a binding promissory 
agreement as to choice of law. However, if the judgment emanates from a Member State, 
such an approach comes very near to reviewing the foreign judgment as to its substance, or 
to second guessing the findings of the foreign court. Even in relation to proceedings brought 
in non-Member States, the very notion of allowing an action for breach of contract in the 
English courts seems likely to bring the English courts into conflict with foreign courts that 
have applied their own choice of law rules.151 
A claimant will be unable to recover damages in respect of the loss which he has suffered if 
he cannot establish a causal link between his loss and the defendant’s breach of contract or 
that the loss is too remote.152 Suppose that the forum classifies a particular issue as 
procedural and the chosen law thus does not properly apply to it. If that rule of the 
procedural law of the forum is the actual cause of the claimant’s loss, the chain of causation 
between the breach of the choice of law agreement and the loss suffered by the claimant 
will be severed. Similarly, the private international law rules of the forum may have caused 
the loss sustained by the claimant by regulating the application of the chosen law. Private 
international law rules are concerned “with the scope of authority of the law, not the 
outcome in the specific case.”153 From this perspective, there is no question of breach of the 
choice of law agreement when the law of the forum applies its choice of law rules. However, 
if it is determined that there is a breach, it may not always be an easy task to appropriate 
the entire blame on non-compliance with or breach of the choice of law agreement. The 
causation issue locates and traces the foundations of the choice of law agreement in the law 
of the forum and demonstrates the futility of viewing choice of law agreements from a 
promissory perspective. 
The natural extrapolation of Briggs’ theoretical speculation is that damages would be 
available for breach of a choice of law agreement. The theory, no matter howsoever elegant 
and persuasive gives rise to significant practical difficulty. A major impediment to the 
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rational development of the remedy is the issue of quantification of damages.154 Suppose 
that there is a choice of law agreement for the law of State A. The courts of another state 
apply the law of State B instead. Should the English courts calculate the loss to the 
defendant overseas by determining what laws the English courts would have applied, and 
what the outcome would have been? The English courts applying the Rome I Regulation, 
may themselves not give unfettered effect to the law of State A, and may have imposed 
upon it mandatory provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement in English law, 
or of some other state. The alternative is to consider the result had the law of State A alone 
been applied, albeit that there may not obviously be any state with jurisdiction which would 
have applied that law in its entirety and without any reservation. The problem gets 
enhanced when the court that denied effect to the clause is outside the EU and has 
fundamentally different choice of law rules as compared to the Rome I Regulation. The root 
cause of the difficulty stems from a misconception that the law chosen in a choice of law 
agreement governs each and every aspect of a dispute. However, as observed above, the 
parties cannot by agreement oust the mandatory choice of law regime of the forum. 
Characterization of an issue as procedural and outside the proper and legitimate ambit of 
the lex causae, the application of overriding mandatory provisions of the forum and other 
states and the public policy of the forum are all outcome determinative and regulate the 
application of the chosen law. An unfettered, freestanding and truly independent choice of 
law which applies irrespective of the law of the forum and its choice of law regime does not 
exist.  
Suppose that the original proceedings took place in England and that it was the English 
courts which were unable to apply the law of State A in its entirety and without any 
reservation.155 Would the English courts applying the choice of law rules of the Rome I 
Regulation, also have to award monetary compensation for the “loss” caused to the 
defendant? By bifurcating the legal functions of a choice of law agreement into the law 
which the parties intended to apply to the contract and the promissory obligation to adhere 
to the chosen law in a choice of law agreement, it may be possible to allow an action for 
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Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2009) 20: “an agreement to arbitrate is a contract of imperfect 
obligation. If it is broken, an award of damages is unlikely to be a practical remedy, given the difficulty of 
quantifying the loss sustained”. 
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damages for breach of contract in this scenario.156 However, it is submitted that the 
defendant will suffer no loss because the English court has applied the chosen law, subject 
to the countervailing factors provided for by the Rome I Regulation. It is neither principled 
nor practicable to separate the procedural and substantive functions of the choice of law 
agreement because the application of Rome I Regulation’s choice of law regime trumps any 
subsisting, independent and promissory obligation to adhere to the chosen law. 
Furthermore, a cause of action for damages for breach of a choice of law agreement will 
negate the impact of the choice of law rules under the Rome I Regulation which makes 
provision for and limits the scope of party autonomy in the first place. 
In addition, one of the reasons for restricting party autonomy in relation to certain types of 
contracts or fact patterns is because the law seeks to avoid the evasion of the rules of a 
particular state. In consumer contracts, the consumer retains the protection of rules of his 
home state, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.157 This is a policy which 
intentionally protects weaker parties and limits party autonomy. However, if the agreement 
to choose another law can be upheld as a private international law bargain, this protection 
might come at a price.158 A business which is sued and subjected to the rules of the 
consumer’s home legal system might obtain damages for that “breach”. 
 
Conclusions 
Choice of law considerations are relegated to a secondary position in international civil and 
commercial litigation before the English courts as compared to international jurisdictional 
and procedural issues. It has been argued that the emerging transnationalist paradigm of 
party autonomy supports a conception of choice of law agreements which borrows from 
both the internationalist and substantive law paradigms of party autonomy but cannot be 
comprehensively justified by either. This integrated and coherent understanding of choice 
of law and the law of contract has led to the conclusion that the choice of law clause is a 
procedural contract but a contract nonetheless.    
Briggs’ promissory analysis of choice of law agreements is a seminal contribution to legal 
scholarship. However, it is unlikely that the parallel existence of choice of law agreements as 
privately enforceable agreements will attract the attention of the CJEU and the European 
legislature. The common law judicial authority coupled with the preponderance of opposing 
academic opinion has meant that the conventional “declaratory” classification of choice of 
law agreements has prevailed over the “promissory” approach.159 In assessing the relevance 
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and significance of attributing an obligation to adhere to the chosen law in a choice of law 
agreement, the internationalist paradigm’s understanding of the fundamental nature of 
private international law rules and their inherent function has helped develop the 
argument.  
If the choice of law regime of the forum is conceptualised as a set of secondary rules for the 
allocation of regulatory authority, the descriptive, normative and interpretive narrative of 
the promissory perspective loses its perceived dominance and coherence as it fails to yield a 
complete and satisfactory justification for what we really understand by those rules. In the 
mantle of secondary power conferring rules as opposed to primary conduct regulating rules, 
choice of law rules perform a very significant public function of allocating regulatory 
authority. From this perspective, it is misplaced and misconceived to interpret choice of law 
clauses as promissory in essence. The promissory justification does not adequately account 
for the authorization of party autonomy by the choice of law rules of the forum, the 
supervening application of the laws of the forum and other states and ultimate forum 
control. Moreover, the pragmatic attractiveness of anti-suit injunctions and claims for 
damages for breach of choice of law agreements may be unsound in principle from the 
standpoint of a truly multilateral conception of private international law based on mutual 
trust or a strong notion of comity. An international private international law will always seek 
to promote civil judicial cooperation between legal systems rather than encourage the clash 
of sovereign legal orders by interfering with the jurisdiction, judgments and choice of law 
apparatus of foreign courts. 
To reiterate, the more reconciled transnationalist paradigm of party autonomy strikes a 
balance between the competing demands of the internationalist and the substantive law 
paradigms. It has been argued that a conception of a choice of law agreement as a contract, 
albeit one that does not give rise to any promises inter partes provides an appropriate 
solution. On the one hand, the choice of law agreement is a bilateral legal act, or a legally 
binding agreement as opposed to a mere “factual” agreement. On the other hand, the 
function of this agreement is not to create or modify rights and obligations: it is to opt out 
of the forum’s objective choice of law rules and to choose the applicable law. Such a 
contract will not contradict the intrinsic logic of choice of law rules because the 
international allocative function remains paramount and is not compromised in any way by 
promises inter partes. The fact that the choice of law agreement is a contract which only 
gives rise to procedural consequences does not mean that it is not, or should not be, 
described as a contract. 
 
   
 
